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On
Tuesday 16 March the Guardian carried an article on the "terror
tribunal member" who quit over
Blunkett. Sir Biran Barder, a lay person sitting on the Special Immigration
Appeals Commission
said he "could not conscientiously play any further part" because
of the home secretary did not "
have to prove anything against the person he wants to deport".
He complained that recent high
court rulings gave Blunkett "such wide discretion as to make
his powers virtually unaccountable".
In the 18 March edition of London Review of Books Brian Barder
explains in detail his reasons for
resignation.
Brian Barder explains why he resigned from the Special Immigration
Appeals Commission
London Review of Books - 18
March 2004
When I was asked, in November 1997, whether
I would allow my name to be submitted to the Lord
Chancellor for appointment as a lay member of the new Special
Immigration Appeals Commission, I
readily agreed, not only because I was flattered, but because
I accepted that special procedures for
appeals against deportation in national security cases were justified.
I believed that SIAC, though
imperfect, was probably the best way of giving maximum protection
both to those appealing against
deportation and to the sources of information essential to the
effective functioning of the security
services. I heard the commission's first case and nothing caused
me there and then to think I was
mistaken in my beliefs. But subsequent developments forced me
to conclude that I could not in all
conscience play any further part in SIAC, and in January this
year I resigned.
SIAC, formally a 'superior court of record', is the sole court
of appeal for foreigners living in Britain
whom the home secretary wants to deport on national security
grounds when some of the evidence
against them is considered too secret to be disclosed. It was
originally established with powers to
confirm, amend or reverse the home secretary's deportation orders
and to issue binding directions
to him when an order seemed to be unjustified. It was set up
in response to a ruling by the
European Court of Human Rights that the previous system - an
advisory panel of 'three wise men',
sitting in secret and giving unenforceable advice to the home
secretary on the correctness or
otherwise of his decision - was in breach of the Convention on
Human Rights, which entitles anyone
whose rights and freedoms under the convention have been violated
to appeal before a court of law.*
The chairman of each SIAC hearing is a high court judge. The
panel of judges with experience in hearing appeals on ordinary
immigration matters. The third
member, a layperson, is someone with experience of analysing
and assessing secret intelligence
and with high security clearance. When SIAC was first established,
only three lay members were
appointed. Since then, as its role has expanded, many more lay
members have joined the panel.
Most are retired senior civil servants, diplomats, or ex-members
of the armed forces and the
intelligence and security services. The lay member is there to
advise his judicial colleagues on how
much weight should be given to the various kinds of secret information
submitted in evidence: how
to allow for the possibility that intercepted communications
may have been deliberately planted,
that informers may have embellished their reports in order to
please their paymasters, or that raw
intelligence may have been misunderstood and misinterpreted by
the agent providing it or by the
intelligence and security officers who receive and process it.
This is an area of which few serving
judges have much, if any, direct knowledge. (The recently retired
Lord Hutton may be an exception,
though his past experience of the intelligence world seems to
have had a questionable effect on his
findings.)
My experience suggests that the lay member's views
on legal questions, though diffidently
expressed, can also sometimes be helpful. It is fair to ask,
however, whether intelligence experts
ought to be full members of the commission, rather than act as
advisers to a panel of three
fully-fledged judges. Former senior civil servants and diplomats
have necessarily been closely
identified for most of their working lives with the Whitehall
and Westminster establishment, and
may be more reluctant than judges to question the wisdom of the
intelligence community, ministers
and their officials. But this, sadly, is the least of SIAC's
problems.
SIAC's first case was an appeal against a home office deportation
order on Shafiq ur Rehman, a
Muslim cleric, and his family. I was the third member of the
three-person hearing. Much of the
evidence submitted to the commission by the home office and the
security service in support of the
home secretary's view that Rehman represented a threat to Britain's
national security was heard in
open hearings in the presence of the appellant and his lawyers.
The home office applied for some of
the other evidence, which included intelligence reports, to be
seen and heard only in closed
sessions from which the appellant and his lawyers would be excluded,
in accordance with the
procedures laid down in the act establishing SIAC. The commission
accepted that some of the
evidence would have to be heard in completely closed session.
However, we also ruled that the less
sensitive parts of the secret evidence could safely be seen and
heard in 'restricted session', from
which the press and public would be excluded but which the appellant
and his lawyers could attend
on the understanding that they were not to reveal it outside
the hearing room.
In the closed sessions, the interests of the appellant were
represented by a 'special advocate'. The
special advocate is drawn from a panel of QCs specialising in
immigration and human rights law
and given security clearance at a level allowing them access
to the classified evidence. Once the
special advocate has seen or heard secret evidence denied to
the appellant, he is barred from
contact with the appellant or his lawyers, so that no sensitive
information can be leaked to them, even unintentionally. It is
obviously unsatisfactory that the appellant is prevented from
knowing all the
evidence against him, but the special advocate, who is present
at all the hearings, is fully familiar
with the appellant's case and well able to deploy his skills
on the appellant's behalf in the closed
sessions - as others who attended those sessions in the Rehman
case can testify.
After exhaustive examination of the evidence, the commission
came to the unanimous conclusion
that none of it had been shown, even to a low level of civil
proof on the balance of probabilities, to
warrant the conclusion that the appellant was such a grave threat
to national security that he ought
to be deported. In reaching this decision, SIAC, unable to rely
on precedent since this was its first
case, had to decide on the level of proof it would apply to the
evidence and on what we took
'national security' to mean in this particular case.
We publicly allowed the appeal on 7 September 1999. There is
no appeal from SIAC on its findings
of fact, but the home secretary took the case to the Court of
Appeal, which duly overturned our
decision on points of law, and was later confirmed by the House
of Lords. One quotation from the
decision of the Court of Appeal gives the flavour:
It is necessary not to look only at the individual allegations
and ask whether they have been proved.
It is also necessary to examine the case as a whole against an
individual and then ask whether on
a global approach that individual is a danger to national security,
taking into account the executive's
policy with regard to national security. When this is done, the
cumulative effect may establish that
the individual is to be treated as a danger, although it cannot
be proved to a high degree of
probability that he has performed any individual act which would
justify this conclusion.
Both higher courts found that action by a foreigner in the UK
which could constitute a threat to the
security of a foreign country, such as raising money for the
'liberation struggle' in Kashmir or
Palestine, could also be construed as a threat to Britain's own
security since the foreign country
concerned might retaliate against British interests - a massive
extension of the common-sense
meaning of 'national security'.
The higher courts' rulings
brought into question the powers of remedy that should be available
to
SIAC. They declared that the home secretary 'is undoubtedly in
the best position to judge what
national security requires . . . The assessment of what is needed
in the light of changing
circumstances is primarily for him.' And: 'The commission was
intended to act judicially and not . .
. to substitute its own opinion for that of the decision maker
on "questions of pure expediency".' The
rulings, taken as a whole, appear to me (though I am not a lawyer)
to establish as part of English
law that the home secretary may deport an immigrant without having
to show that any single one of
his past activities contributes towards a case for deportation.
He may act in this way merely on the
grounds of his belief that future activities of the person concerned
might threaten national security,
however indirectly. SIAC now has only the most limited power
to pass judgment on the reasonableness of that belief. It is
difficult to see what functions are left for SIAC short of a
decision
by the home secretary so wildly irrational as manifestly to warrant
judicial intervention. These
rulings give him such wide discretion as to make his powers virtually
unaccountable.
The Court of Appeal and the Law Lords ordered
the Rehman case to be heard again by SIAC,
applying the rulings on points of law issued by the higher courts.
Had SIAC, this time differently
constituted, heard the case all over again, it would probably
have had to refuse the appeal. But we
shall never know: after lengthy delay, the home office withdrew
the deportation order. Apparently,
the threat allegedly posed by the suspect had become one that
the security authorities now judged
they (and we) could live with after all.
Since then, there has been a further alarming
development. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001 extended the remit of the - now toothless - commission
to cover appeals by aliens who
are indefinitely imprisoned without charge because they are suspected
of involvement in terrorism,
but can't safely be deported without the risk of torture or other
ill-treatment in their own countries.
Here, too, it is the sole court of appeal. Indefinite imprisonment
without trial is in breach of the
European Convention on Human Rights (and the UK Human Rights
Act), but the government has
declared a state of national emergency which enables it to suspend
the application to Britain of the
relevant provisions of the convention. In this context, a 'state
of emergency' is defined as 'an
exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the
whole population and constitutes a
threat to the organised life of the community'. Plainly no such
exceptional situation exists, and no
other European country has found it necessary to take these extreme
steps. The question of the
legality of the government's derogation from the convention,
and the fictitious 'emergency' declared
to legitimise it, may ultimately have to be decided by the European
Court of Human Rights; a ruling
could take years. Meanwhile, SIAC must continue to administer
a law whose provisions for
indefinite imprisonment without trial seem plainly unacceptable
in a democracy, contrary to British
traditions of civil liberties and justice, and in breach of our
international obligations. The comparison
with Guantanamo made by some commentators is not entirely fair:
at least our detainees are
theoretically free to walk out of Belmarsh Prison tomorrow if
they can find a country willing to take
them; and at least they have lawyers in Britain working on their
behalf. Nevertheless, there is
enough truth in the comparison to undermine British government
protests at the Guantanamo
monstrosity as it affects the Britons held there, and to make
ministers' efforts on their behalf look
hypocritical.
It is perhaps a measure of the extent to which SIAC has been
hobbled by the legal imperatives
handed down by the higher courts that the commission has not
so far allowed a single appeal by
any of the dozen or more people who have been imprisoned under
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act. SIAC's one finding (in 2002) against the legitimacy
of the act - a finding overturned on
appeal by the home secretary - was that it breached the Convention
on Human Rights by
discriminating against foreigners. Apparently, if all of us could
also be locked up without trial,
everything would be just fine.
I am under no illusion that the resignation of one insignificant
member of a sizeable panel of lay
members of SIAC, even if one of the original three, will precipitate
a crisis of confidence in the
institution or a radical rethink of its operation. It would be
impertinent and self-contradictory to
suggest that the rulings of the Court of Appeal and the Law Lords
were or could be wrong in law.
Those rulings are the law. But we should consider their implications
for the human rights of those
facing deportation or, failing deportation, prison. In a press
statement on 25 February, David
Blunkett claimed that the existence of SIAC as a court of appeal
helped to justify the continuation
of the government's extraordinary powers. Given SIAC's current
emasculation, this claim looks
distinctly disingenuous. It is questionable whether SIAC, now
buckled into the legal straitjacket
imposed on it by the two highest courts, can really act as an
effective champion against error or
abuse by the executive. If, as seems to be the case, the law
no longer permits SIAC to function as
intended, it is up to parliament to change it.
Footnotes
* See John Upton in the LRB, 22 January.
Brian Barder was British ambassador to Ethiopia, Poland and
Benin, and high commissioner in
Nigeria and Australia. He retired in 1994.
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